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ABSTRACT
Interactive media arts offer us new approaches to the role of theatrical representa-
tion. Nowadays, digital technology allows us to explore self-representation in systems 
that cross over between installation art, theatre and performance. By confronting the 
subject with his or her own image, these devices question the mechanisms of identi-
fication and denegation. Both the theatrical creations and the interactive forms that 
are examined here invite the spectator to explore the relationship between identifica-
tion and denegation. All the artistic productions that are studied in this article call 
for a virtual double that the immersant meets: Liquid Views (1992) and Rigid 
Waves ([1993] 2008) by Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss, Telematic 
Dreaming ([1992] 2007) by Paul Sermon and Eux (2008) by the Crew company 
and Sensorama (2009) by the Andwhatbeside(s)death company. In all of these 
artworks, the participant is encouraged to give less importance to his or her cognitive 
senses in order to allow his or her sensations to create a representation of himself or 
herself. The overlap between identity and otherness is therefore to be found at the 
very heart of the sensitive body.
Theatre constitutes a representative art par excellence. Ever since it first 
emerged as an art form, and indeed in the many different guises that it has 
taken over the centuries, theatrical representation has played a key role in the 
process of bringing together the ideas of presence and absence. The power 
of theatre originates from the unique confrontation that is brought about 
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 2. Term proposed by the 
artist Char Davies (in 
Dixon 2007: 372).
by the fact that an actor’s presence necessarily entails the absence of the 
character he or she is playing. This clash is at the root of a certain virtuality. As 
Matthew Causey (2009: 15) reminds us, due to its illusory immediacy, theatre 
has always been virtual. 
Interactive media arts offer us new approaches to the role of theatrical 
representation. Albeit in a contrasting manner, these two art forms share a 
common understanding of the function of representation. In the follow-
ing quote, Simon Penny highlights the different methods of representation 
apparent in painting, cinema and in media arts:
A painting is an instance of representation. A film is a sequence of repre-
sentations. Interactive artworks are not instances of representation, they 
are virtual machines which themselves produce instances of representa-
tion based on real-time inputs.
(in Fleischmann and Strauss 2008: 275)
Both theatre and the interactive arts are based on signs created in our space–
time continuum, to the extent that media artists such as Monika Fleischmann 
and Wolfgang Strauss view theatre as a more influential paradigm than 
cinema, which is often referred to as the origin of the media arts. 
Both the theatrical creations and the interactive forms that are examined 
here invite the spectator to explore the relationship between identification 
and denegation. The theatregoer is plunged into the narrative because of the 
identification process. The latter is somewhat counterbalanced by denegation 
(I know that dramatic action is a scenic illusion but I believe in it all the same). 
A complete immersion in the narrative is impossible due to the fact that the 
theatrical sign is rooted in reality. The identification–denegation structure is 
situated at the very heart of the subject’s sensitive body within the field of 
immersive interactive arts. This is plunged into a system that blurs the line 
between mediated signs (recorded and retransmitted in front of the partici-
pant’s eyes) and immediate signs. Faced with these contradictory perceptions, 
we see that it is above all thanks to his or her flesh that the spectator is able to 
consistently connect these two stimuli. 
Up to this point we have mentioned the representation of the other and the 
identification of otherness. Nowadays, digital technology allows us to explore 
self-representation in systems that cross over between installation art, theatre 
and performance. By confronting the subject with his or her own image, these 
devices question the mechanisms of identification and denegation. All the 
artistic systems that are studied in this article call for a virtual double that 
the immersant2 meets: Liquid Views (1992) and Rigid Waves ([1993] 2008) by 
Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss, Telematic Dreaming ([1992] 2007) 
by Paul Sermon, Eux (2008) by the Crew company and Sensorama (2009) by 
the Andwhatbeside(s)death company. The now indistinct boundary between 
identity and otherness necessitates the use of the whole body in order to 
perceive the difference. Contrary to the persistent school of thought in cyber 
culture, virtual experience is above all a bodily experience. It is at the centre of 
the body of the immersant, in a virtual self-representation, that identity and 
otherness intertwine. 
Performances based on the meeting of a virtual double provide us with 
an opportunity to study the connections between self and other, body and 
spirit and flesh and technology. It is possible to identify at least two of the 
approaches of the virtual double. The first is based on a felt fascination for 
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one’s digital image while the second explores the uncertainty provoked by the 
nature of this so-called self-representation. 
1. SELF-IMAGE AND TECHNOLOGICAL FASCINATION: LIQUID VIEWS 
AND TELEMATIC DREAMING
The denigration of the physical body by certain branches of virtual culture has 
already been shown. Deborah Lupton (1995: 100) reminds us that the body is 
frequently viewed as an obstacle to technological pleasures. On the contrary, a 
cyborg perfectly embodies a figure released from the constraints of basic bodily 
functions – this ideal body never needs to go to the toilet and never feels tired. 
Kevin Robins (1995: 138) develops the widely accepted opinion that states 
that the rejection of this parasitic body leads to a feeling of transcendence and 
to the end of the physical body’s ability to define identity. Freed from all that 
is material, the self is transformed into a floating, polymorphous authority. 
Liquid Views and Telematic Dreaming provide us with examples of this techno-
logical fascination. These two important creations were initially presented at 
the beginning of the 1990s, a decade marked by developments in the domain 
of Internet and telecommunication. In this context, optimism and enthusiasm 
for information technology was readily accepted. 
Liquid Views reworks the myth of Narcissus into an interactive media 
installation. Visitors are invited to observe their own reflection on a horizon-
tal, mirror-like screen that produces a watery reflection. As soon as the screen 
is touched, the image blurs in the same way as a reflection on water. 
However, information technology has replaced the phenomenon of natu-
ral reflection: the subject is not confronted by a reflected image but rather by a 
video copy that is projected in front of him or her. For Steve Dixon (2007: 245), 
the original myth of the search for the sublime here takes the form of a tech-
nological sublime. Nowadays, we are fascinated by technological capacities; 
human vanity is being dislodged in favour of technological potential, hence an 
individual’s growing ability to identify himself or herslef with a virtual image. 
In the same way, the famous performance Telematic Dreaming engenders 
the process of self-identification with a digital image. This installation is made 
up of two separate spaces, both of which include a bed. One is occupied by 
Figure 1: Liquid Views by Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss © Monika 
Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss.
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the performance artist Susan Kozel and the other by a visitor to the gallery. 
Above each of the beds, there is a camera that takes an image of the sleeping 
person and projects the image of Susan Kozel onto the bed where the visitor 
is sleeping and vice versa. In this way, each participant enters into contact 
with the other’s double. 
A monitor rebroadcasts the video image, which combines the two record-
ings. Therefore, the participant sees both the double of a stranger on his or 
her bed and his or her own image on the monitor. The physical and digital 
presence of bodies on the bed generates a telematic space, in which the 
participants enter into a long-distance relationship. Sermon’s partner, Andrea 
Zapp (in Birringer 1999: 376), highlights the fact that the projection of his or 
her own image allows the individual to exist outside his or her own personal 
space. His or her very understanding of his or her identity is thus modified:
[…] The telematic performance affects consciousness of body and self 
in such a way that the user’s attention, initially focused on the real bed, 
after a while is no more concentrated on the immediate environment 
but on the distant telematic one and the virtual movement.
(in Birringer 1999: 375)
This fascinated identification with a digital image relegates the importance of 
the individual’s physical body to second place. However, the fusion between 
the physical and the virtual body is not absolute. Susan Kozel reports that, 
upon repetition, this performance transforms the fusion into a bipolar rela-
tionship: as soon as the body starts to cramp, it remembers its existence and 
confronts ‘[…] the abjection of flesh and the sanitization of technology’ (in 
Dixon 2007: 217). In his analysis of virtual reality, Michael Heim (1995: 73) 
also evokes the phenomenon of ‘coming and going’ that occurs between the 
physical and digital body. 
Figure 2: Telematic Dreaming by Paul Sermon © Paul Sermon [simulation 0029].
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Despite the fascination for the digital image, the physical body remains. 
Steve Dixon goes even further and states that the fundamental aim of digital 
performance is the eradication of any separation between the body and the 
spirit. This opinion needs to be qualified. Without necessarily considering the 
physical body as an obstacle to disembodiment, these performances certainly 
favour identification with the digital body. We agree with Dixon (2007: 215), 
who says that the iconic body should not make us forget the active or the 
effective body. However, not forgetting does not mean that one really takes 
account of or integrates it into one’s artistic system. 
2. SELF-IMAGE AND UNCERTAINTY: RIGID WAVES, 
EUX, SENSORAMA
Encouraged by the optimism for new methods of telecommunication in the 
1990s, Liquid Views and Telematic Dreaming generated an identification of 
the individual with his or her virtual double. In the second section of this 
article, the artistic productions referenced will no longer be rooted in techno-
logical fascination. Rather, they will neglect the hypnotic dimension of digital 
techniques in favour of inviting the participant to question his or her own way 
of perceiving and constructing his or her identity. This questioning is realized 
through the body. The latter no longer appears as merely an effective body 
but also as the nerve centre of this investigation. 
In this section, three different means of viewing the virtual double as an 
indicator of uncertainty are evoked: reflection (Rigid Waves and Eux), the 
doppelgänger (Eux) and sensory disembodiment (Eux and Sensorama).
2.1 Trouble and reflection
One year after Liquid Views, Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss put 
forward Rigid Waves. The fascination provoked by identifying oneself with 
a reflected image gave way to a sense of disquiet generated by a deformed 
self-image. The participant had to face a mirror-screen. A video camera was 
concealed in the frame, in order to film the participant and to allow the projec-
tion of his or her image onto the screen. Therefore, the image would lose its 
realism as the subject approached the screen. 
The technological system takes into account the participant’s movements 
and changes the images accordingly: for example, they can be slowed down, 
speeded up or frozen. The comparability between what is happening and its 
reflection is broken. For the artists, this dissimilarity invites the subject to ‘[…] 
see oneself from the outside, to stand side by side with oneself and to discover 
Figure 3: Rigid Waves by Monika Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss © Monika 
Fleischmann and Wolfgang Strauss.
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other hidden “selfs”’ (Fleishmann and Strauss 2004). While Liquid Views 
references Narcissus’ fascination for a watery image, Rigid Waves concentrates 
on Narcissus’ inability to recognize his own reflection. Here the participant 
is invited to abandon his or her now treacherous mirror-image, in order to 
construct his or her own identity. This construction process necessitates the 
recognition of otherness. In this installation, the reflected image becomes a 
representation of the other. 
Crew’s productions can be placed at the overlap between installation, thea-
tre and performance. The company integrates the spectator’s body into the 
immersive system from a dramaturgic point of view; the question of the sensi-
tive body is treated here as much from the viewpoint of a fable as through 
immersive technologies. In Eux, the spectator takes on the role of a patient 
suffering from agnosia (the loss of ability to recognize things). The perceptive 
problems caused by this illness provide the starting point for an exploration of 
our processes of perception and identity construction. The participant is thrown 
into a modified perception, using a head-mounted display and headphones. 
The transition from spectator to protagonist occurs through the endorsement 
of an item of clothing: the subject slips on a hospital gown. The imposition of 
this restrictive item contributes in its own way to the modification of his or 
her haptic senses. In essence, the feeling of immersion comes from the 360° 
vision that the head-mounted display allows; the projected image follows 
all the head’s movements. These images combine recorded sequences with 
live scenes. The story is told in real time by a performer situated next to the 
participant. The system is not strictly interactive in that the participant is not 
able to effect the virtual environment or use his or her initiative. The subject 
is touched by the performers but is unable to respond to this contact. The 
actions of the character that he or she portrays are self-reflexive; he or she 
observes the world and tries to understand how his or her perception has been 
changed by the illness. The spectator’s feelings are linked to the fable. The 
participant’s movements are not free; he or she is generally sitting down, being 
moved on a trolley or guided by an assistant. In order for the performance to 
work properly, it is essential that this dramaturgic role is respected. 
The immersive environment created by Crew is close to the principles 
of virtual reality. Philippe Fuchs et al. (2006: 7) define the later as a proc-
ess that allows the subject to ‘remove himself from physical reality in order 
to virtually change the time, place and or type of interaction’. However, this 
physical removal is not integral in these performances: rather than an absolute 
immersion into a virtual world, whereby the participant identifies completely 
with his or her avatar, the protagonist in Eux is constantly asked to negoti-
ate between his or her bodily perceptions and his or her cognitive process. 
The company’s researcher and dramaturge, Kurt Vanhoutte, along with Nele 
Wynants and Philippe Bekaert (2008: 159–62), examines how these perform-
ances install such sensory deprivation in the spectator. They transform the 
performance space into a ‘transitional space’ in which the boundary between 
the real and the virtual universe is no longer discernable. A complete immer-
sion is prevented by the body’s constant appeals; the absence of a virtual world 
is confronted to the presence of true haptic perceptions. 
This constant confrontation between presence and absence is particularly 
apparent in the mirror-scene in Eux, when the subject is placed in front of his 
or her supposed reflection. The animate image of a patient, wearing the same 
gown, with the same headpiece, is projected in front of his or her eyes. Is it his 
or her own body? The almost simultaneous actions of the video protagonist 
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and the participant add to the confusion: in the video, the subject colours 
in one by one the squares on a crossword that has been placed on his or 
her thorax. In a manner as close to complete synchronization as possible, a 
performer leads the protagonist to make the same action on his or her own 
body. As the camera is omnidirectional, the subject is able to modify the angle 
of his or her vision and change the projected image in relation to his or her 
head movements. The dynamic nature of the projected image also accentuates 
his or her identification with the image – the latter adapts itself to all the 
subject’s head movements. This can look at the face or any other part of the 
projected body. 
In order to determine whether the visually perceived body is his or her 
own, the subject is obliged to deeply examine his or her visual and haptic 
senses, which are slightly contradictory. Here the sensory deprivation invites 
a unique balance between the generally dominant visual perception and the 
other senses. Kurt Vanhoutte et al. state that the domination of sight allows 
the subject to identify the filmed body as his or her own; the subject appro-
priates the body that he or she perceives visually. This research is based on 
a study by Maravita et al. (in Van Houtte et al. 2008: 161), which stated that 
in multisensory conflicts, vision dominates proprioception and touch. If we 
take into consideration Ernst and Banks’ model (in Fuchs et al. 2006: 453), 
it appears necessary to question visual perception’s domination, as haptic 
perceptions also actively participate in the creation of a coherent representa-
tion of the world. 
Identification with the projected image is only suggested by the system. 
In the performance, the participant is not actually duped for a very long time, 
and realizes that the animate image is not his or her own reflection. Moreover, 
the video is identical for all of the participants, regardless of their morphology 
or sex. Nevertheless, the confrontation between visual and haptic perception 
obliges the subject to step back from the visual stimuli that are largely domi-
nant in the spatial construction of our identity. Here it is the affected flesh 
Figure 4: Eux by Crew/Eric Joris © Eric Joris.
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that determines the outline of the physical body and not the supposed visual 
reflection. This performance forces the subject to take notice of the difficulty 
of resisting the power of the reflected image and of ignoring visually perceived 
information. In the manner of Rigid Waves, in reality the self-reflection 
consists of a representation of otherness. While this ‘deception’ is obvious in 
Rigid Waves, it is more concealed in Eux and in order for it to be revealed, it is 
necessary to have recourse to the body. 
2.2 The doppelgänger
It is possible to analyse the approach to the double in Eux in three different 
ways. The second way of doing so comprises the doppelgänger. The Crew 
company mentions this theme in the programme that accompanies this 
performance. 
The doppelgänger is a very common concept that is frequently encoun-
tered in folklore and the paranormal. When discussing this theme, Dixon 
bases his ideas on the approach of Hans Holzer, borrowed from magic:
The concept of human double (or doubles) has remained a constant 
factor in folklore and tradition, particularly the belief that every human 
being accompanied through life by two extensions of his personality, 
the one good and the other evil; the former luminous and the latter dark 
and menacing.
(in Dixon 2007: 250)
Dixon applies this point of view to performances, as he believes that the 
digital double ‘[…] is likewise an alternate, and invariably darker embodi-
ment’ (2007: 250). All the same, this psychological approach is not character-
istic of all artistic explorations of the doppelgänger; for example, Crew neglects 
it completely. Therefore, we will turn our attention to the issues specific to the 
digital doppelgänger in terms of self-perception, rather than in terms of the 
psychological problematics. 
In opposing ways, the reflected image and the doppelgänger question the 
links between identity and otherness. In the first instance, the aesthetic issue 
consists of creating the feelings of one’s own body on the basis of the image of 
one that is unknown. The aim is that the subject identifies himself or herself as 
the animate image. On the other hand, Crew’s treatment of the doppelgänger 
seems to have the objective of encouraging a feeling of otherness while at the 
same time maintaining the perception of one’s own image. 
At the beginning of the performance, the subject is invited to go into one 
of the rooms in which an omnidirectional video camera has been placed on 
a trolley. Although the participant is oblivious to this, the camera films him 
or her from the moment he or she enters the room. In the final part of the 
performance, the video of his or her image is projected in front of his or her 
eyes. When he or she first perceives the visual stimuli of the familiar surround-
ings the participant may believe that he or she is in the same room, as he or 
she does not know where he or she has been and is now. A few seconds later, 
he or she sees an animate image of himself or herself. Once more, the dynamic 
nature of the multidirectional video intensifies the sense of unease resulting 
from the combination of recorded image and immediate visual perceptions: 
the image adapts to all his or her movements. Thus, the subject is immersed 
in an environment that is also occupied by the virtual double. 
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The digital double, moving independent of the participant’s movements, 
prevents the participant from identifying his or her own image. It is no longer 
a question of a reflection but rather of a veritable virtual alter ego. The pres-
ence of the doubles unbalances the individual and the localized character of 
self. The neuroscientists BignaLenggenhager et al. (2009: 110) have shown that 
the construction of a unified self can be separate from the origins of its visual 
perception and the position of its body. Self-representation can be altered by 
modifying these two parameters; in this way the virtual body intervenes in 
the perception of the physical body. The integration of a digital double in Eux 
can be indirectly linked to the experiments led by Lenggenhager et al. In the 
same way as in Crew’s example, this team equipped the subject with a head-
piece, which projected the image of his or her own back in front of his or her 
eyes. Hence, the participant could see his or her own body in front of him 
or her. At the same time, his or her body was touched with a baton; there-
fore, he or she perceived a double stimulus, which was both haptic and visual. 
This research established that the participants identified themselves with the 
virtual body, and hence mistook the location of their body, thinking that it 
was several metres further forward, in the same place as the virtual double. 
The following diagram illustrates this discovery: 
The first square [1] represents the real position of his or her own body; the 
second square [2] refers to the position that the subject imagines his or her 
body is in, having been influenced by his or her identification with the image 
of himself or herself that is projected in front of his or her eyes. In such a case, 
visual perception would play a greater role in the construction of his or her own 
identity; the subject will rely on his or her haptic senses to a lesser degree. 
Both the scientific and the artistic experiences evoked here recognize the 
dominance of visual stimuli in localizing the situation of one’s own body. 
The doppelgänger’s confrontation in Eux is not based on a conflict between 
Figure 5: Experiment by Lenggenhager et al. (2008) [doppelgänger].
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visual and haptic perception. Conversely, in the performance the participant is 
encouraged to feel uncertain as to the situation of his or her own body. Is he 
or she in the bedroom as the animated image would suggest? Once he or she 
realizes that the projected image is in fact a recorded video, the participant is 
forced to abandon his or her visual stimuli in order to construct a representa-
tion of himself or herself and the world that surrounds him or her. In effect, 
his or her visual stimuli stand testament to the fact that the animated image 
has become that of another, that of his or her virtual doppelgänger. 
The overlapping of identity and otherness through the intermediary of a 
technological system leads us back to the phenomenon of ‘disjonction sans 
méconnaissance’/‘disjunction without misinterpretation’ as shown by Pascal 
Le Maléfan (2005: 529). 
He defines this in the following manner: 
[…] The recognition of one’s own body from a distance, and the fact 
of being separated from it whilst at the same time continuing to recog-
nise it as one’s own, but with the clear feeling that it is no longer the 
home of one’s consciousness. […] This body has no consideration for 
the subjectivity which exists externally: he has nothing to do with it and 
has no perceptible intentions.
(Le Maléfan 2005: 529–30)
Let us straight away try to avoid any misunderstandings: disjunction with-
out misinterpretation does not really occur in Eux, as the double is created by 
technology and not by the subject’s initiative. In the same way as the proc-
esses that recreated the effects of agnosia, the company uses omnidirectional 
video to make the participant perceive things in a troubling manner. In the 
case of disjunction without misinterpretation, the sight of a faraway body does 
not endanger the construction of self: the subject is led to determine his or her 
own body’s limits, its position and the home of his or her consciousness. After 
a few seconds, the participant in Eux distinguishes himself or herself from his 
or her doppelgänger, a body that is both his or her own and yet also detached 
from him or her. He or she perceives the sense of otherness, while at the same 
time basing this on his or her own image. 
2.3 Sensory disembodiment 
The third and final approach to the double is linked to the aesthetic of uncer-
tainty that exists in the simulation of sensory disembodiment. In the same 
way as in the disjunction without misinterpretation method, the technologi-
cal system takes over, in order to compensate for the participant’s lack of real 
perceptive failures. Therefore, a true sensory disembodiment is not produced. 
Ever since research into this area first started at the end of the nineteenth 
century, it has been provoking lively and enthusiastic opposition. A first diffi-
culty can be identified as the diversity of terms used. Like many others, Pascal 
Le Maléfan (2005: 514) laments this diverse terminology and notes that the 
concept of out-of-body experiences can indicate a great variety of phenomena, 
thereby engendering a lack of precision. We chose to follow Bernard Andrieu 
acceptation of ‘sensory disembodiment’ (2010: 334–53), which brings to light 
the fact that this phenomenon is essentially concerned with the body and 
does not concern the more traditional separation of the spirit and the body in 
the search for transcendence. The distinction between ‘corporal intentionality’ 
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and ‘intention of the consciousness’ is central to Andrieu’s theory. He high-
lights the fact that the former precedes the latter, and thus that the construc-
tion of the body’s identity passes through different stages that come before 
any form of consciousness:
Intentionality is the expression of a clear association between mental 
and bodily activities, as the capacity to produce intentional acts with an 
interactive and adaptive aim with regards to the environment does not 
engender a spiritual exclusivity. […] The body, using its motive inten-
tionality, produces a non-conceptual savoir-faire which shows itself in 
a bodily habit.
(Andrieu 2010: 355)
Andrieu’s work noticeably agrees with the neuroscientific work of Christopher 
Lopez et al. They state that sensory disembodiment results from a subject’s 
failure to integrate multisensory corporal information (Lopez et.al 2008: 
149–61). The subject is no longer able to construct a unified identity for 
himself or herself; because the stimuli are contradictory, he or she is no longer 
able to combine them to create a coherent representation. The phantom arm 
experience constitutes a well-known example of such a conflict: information 
coming from the motor system (the presence of an arm) is contradicted by 
visual information (the absence of the limb). Therefore, two representations of 
the body exist side by side. 
The simulation of sensory disembodiment that is explored in Eux and 
Sensorama can be approached from this theoretical angle, as two representa-
tions of the body remain in competition.
In these two performances, the phenomenon of disembodiment is not 
limited to one part of the body but rather concerns the body as a whole. 
Figure 6: The real position of the body (B) and the overhanging perspective thanks 
to the headpiece (A) [disembodiment].
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In each of the sequences, the participant lies down on his or her back. A video 
camera is placed above him or her. In this way, the subject observes his or her 
own body from an elevated view point. In Eux, this sequence takes place while 
the assistants equip him or her with technological material. In Sensorama, 
disembodiment is more deeply explored, and coupled with an exploration 
of the haptic senses. An individual lying next to the subject appears on the 
image. Adopting the same position as the participant, this individual then 
takes off his or her headpiece and moves closer to the subject, then touching 
his or her arm for several seconds. In the same way as Telematic Dreaming, 
virtual contact is created between the flesh and blood participant and a digital 
character. However, two major differences differentiate the systems. First, in 
Paul Sermon’s installation, the meeting is interactive, while in Sensorama the 
individual’s action is recorded beforehand. Second, in Sensorama, the partici-
pant observes the meeting from a modified (elevated) perspective; he or she 
observes not only the virtual character but also his or her own actions. 
In Eux and Sensorama, the modification of a lying down individual’s normal 
perspective (B) creates the effect of overhanging with regard to what is actu-
ally happening: instead of looking towards the ceiling the subject looks at the 
floor and hence overhangs his or her own body (A). This perspectival modi-
fication creates the impression of leaving one’s body. While the subject locates 
his or her consciousness in his or her own body in the case of disjunction 
without misinterpretation (see Section 2.2), he or she feels that this has been 
moved upwards. The participant identifies himself or herself with the over-
hanging position; his or her consciousness seems to be located in the virtual 
double. The embodiment, which Lopez et al. (2008: 150) define as the feeling 
that one’s self is located within the physical limits of the body, is disturbed. 
Henceforth, the self is located outside the body. 
Lopez et al. (2008: 154) confirm the importance of the horizontal position 
in order for a sensory disembodiment to take place. According to different 
research, around 80 per cent of such phenomena take place in this posi-
tion. This can be explained by the reduction of kinaesthetic feelings in this 
position. At the base of disembodiment, there lies a sensory conflict: the 
kinaesthetic feelings confirm that the subject is lying down on his or her 
back, while the visual perceptions indicate an overhanging perspective. As 
the kinaesthetic feelings are less powerful in an immobile body, the visual 
information overrides them and creates an out-of-body sensation. The 
impossibility of combining these two pieces of information into one self-
representation (via the cortex) creates a wavering feeling. The self is situated 
both inside and outside the physical body. In the case of sensory disembodi-
ment, the participant’s body is a vessel of both identity and otherness. This 
overlap operates at the same level as perception and does not constitute the 
product of cognitive effort. 
3. THE VIRTUAL DOUBLE, BETWEEN IDENTITY AND OTHERNESS
Digital technology allows us an infinite number of ways of exploring the rela-
tionships that exist between identity and otherness, and thus reinforces the 
intensity of these questions at the heart of performing arts. The integration of 
the virtual double constitutes a privileged think tank for us to examine the way 
in which a subject creates his or her identity when he or she is confronted with 
his or her own image. The latter can be the source of a feeling of either identity 
or otherness. The confrontation between the participant and his or her double 
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has been studied from two different aesthetic angles. The first, brought about 
by an enthusiasm for new technology, concerns the fascination one feels for 
one’s own digital image. The second rather concerns the uncertainty that is felt 
with regard to the nature of this supposed self-representation. 
Steve Dixon rejects the idea that digital artists are concerned with the 
search for a sort of transcendence, whereby the spirit would detach itself 
from the physical body in order to identify itself fully with its virtual double. 
While both types of creation take into account the participant’s body, it is only 
in the second set of examples that the question of a reactive body is given 
an important role in the artistic research. Meetings with one’s reflection or 
doppelgänger, along with the sensation of disembodiment, constitute three 
intensely sensorial experiences. In all of them, the participant is encouraged to 
give less importance to his or her cognitive senses in order to allow his or her 
sensations to create a representation of himself or herself and the world that 
surrounds him or her. The overlap between identity and otherness is therefore 
to be found at the very heart of the sensitive body. 
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